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ABORTING THE INDECENCY STANDARD IN POLITICAL
PROGRAMMING
[T]he principal ingredient of the licensee's obligation to
operate his station in the public interest is the diligent,
positive, and continuing effort by the licensee to discover
and fulfill the tastes, needs, and desires of his community
or service area, for broadcast service.'
In the 1992 political season, the use of graphic
aborted fetuses in television commercials by political
candidates fostered much public debate.2 Michael
Bailey was a Republican congressional candidate
from Indiana who formulated graphic commercials
and permitted them to be used by candidates in four-
teen other states.3 Three basic formats were used:
The first advertisement aired divided the television
screen between images of "Choice A," a live baby,
and "Choice B," an aborted fetus; in the second for-
mat, the candidates broadcast commercials equating
legalized abortion to the Holocaust by showing
graphic aborted fetal tissue beside prisoners of Au-
schwitz; and, finally, the candidates ran ads showing
tweezers pulling apart aborted fetal tissue in a petri
dish.4 During the months in which those ads aired,
the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"
or "Commission"), received over 1200 telephone
calls and 300 letters, the vast majority of which com-
1 Commission en banc Programming Inquiry, Report and
Statement of Policy Res, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2316 (1960) [hereinaf-
ter 1960 Programming Inquiry].
' See e.g., Nightline: Graphic Political Anti-Abortion Ads
(ABC News television broadcast, Aug. 31, 1992)[hereinafter
Nightline]; David Pendered, Abortion: The Supreme Court
Rules, ATL. CONST., June 30, 1992, at A9; Edmund L. An-
drews, The 1992 Campaign Issues: Abortion; F.C.C. Decision
Opens Airwaves for Vivid Anti-Abortion Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
27, 1992, at A20, c.3; William Booth, Antiabortion TV Ads
Catch On in Campaigns; Protection for Federal Candidates Gets
Graphic Images Past Censors, WASH. POST, July 20, 1992, at
Al; Bobby Kahn, Abortion Ads: Zap Those Commercials, ATL.
CONST., July 10, 1992, at All.
' Media: Sides Dispute Effects of "Graphic" Ads, AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Sept. 9, 1992 available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library.
4 Booth, supra note 2, at Al.
5 Interview with Milton 0. Gross, Esq., Chief, Fairness and
Political Programming Branch, Enforcement Division, Mass
Media Bureau, FCC, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 29, 1992).
' See Letter from the FCC to San Fran. Century Brdcst.
L.P. (KMEL(FM)), 7 FCC Rcd. 4857, 4857 (1992); Letter
from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to L.M. Communications of
plained about the graphic nature of the content of
those ads.
5
Almost simultaneously, the FCC was imposing
fines on radio stations whose disc jockeys violated
federal law by using indecent language during their
radio programs while children were likely to be in
the listening audience.6 It is inconsistent that the
FCC would sanction these radio stations in an at-
tempt to curb the exposure of indecent programming
to children, while prohibiting licensees from limiting
political candidates' free use of arguably disturbing
images without regard for child viewers.'
Since its formation in 1934, the FCC has had the
authority to regulate broadcasting to serve the public
interest, convenience and necessity.' Toward these
ends, the FCC has enforced federal law prohibiting
obscene programming9 and has determined that pro-
gramming which is indecent must be channeled to
time periods when the risk that children will be in
the audience is minimal."0 The federal statute regu-
lating broadcast content in terms of obscenity and in-
decency is 18 U.S.C. § 1464. It states "[W]hoever
utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined not
S. C., Inc. (WYBB(FM)), 7 FCC Rcd. 1595, 1595 (1992)[here-
inafter Stewart Letter]; Letter from the FCC to Mel Karmazin,
Pres., Sagittarius Brdcst. Corp. (WXRK(FM)), Infinity Brdcst.
Corp. of Pa. (WYSP(FM)), Infinity Brdcst. Corp. of Wash.,
D.C., (WJFK(FM)), 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 989 (1992)
[hereinafter Infinity].
' See Letter from the FCC to Vincent A. Pepper, Esq.,
Counsel, Gillett Communications of Atl., Inc. [hereinafter Gil-
lett] and Irving Gastfreund, Esq., Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
and Handler [hereinafter Kaye, Scholer], 7 FCC Rcd. 5599
(1992).
8 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151, passim
(1988).
9 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988); See also 47 U.S.C.
§§ 312(a)(6), 503(b)(1)(D) (1988).
10 New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to
All Broadcast and Amateur Radio Licensees, Public Notice, 2
FCC Rcd. 2726, 2726 (1987); see also In re Infinity Brdcst.
Corp. of Pa., Licensee of Station WYSP(FM); In re Pacifica
Foundation, Inc., Licensee of Station KPFK(FM); In re The
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., Licensee of Station KCSB(FM),
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987)
[hereinafter 1987 Order].
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more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both."" Conflicting with section 1464 is
another federal statute, section 315 of the Communi-
cations Act of 1934 ("Communications Act" or
"Act").' 2 Section 315 prohibits a broadcast licensee
from censoring the content of a political candidate's
material.' 3 The identified purpose in granting that
immunity was to allow a candidate an unfettered op-
portunity to disseminate her political views to the
voting public. 4 Hence, section 315 has been con-
strued as sacrosanct, conferring an exemption upon
political candidates from our nation's obscenity and
indecency laws.' 5 Thus arises a tug-of-war between
two federal statutes and a clash of interests with re-
spect to political candidates and children.
This Comment addresses the apparent conflict be-
tween the FCC's political and children's program-
ming policies. Part I explores the evolution of those
policies through the FCC's reasonable access and in-
decency standards. Part II will then review current
applications of the standards enunciated in both the
political and non-political arenas. Discussion in this
section focuses on debate over the use of graphic
aborted fetuses in political advertisements to illumi-
nate the conflict between the statutes and the com-
peting interests of political candidates and children.
Part III then analyzes the implications of these de-
velopments and offers two possible avenues for reso-
lution. Part IV concludes that the current exemption
2 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
12 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988).
" Id. Section 315(a) of the Communications Act reads:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broad-
casting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, that such licensee shall
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
under the provisions of this section.
Id.
14 Farmers Educational & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc.,
360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959) ("More important, it is obvious that
permitting a broadcast station to censor allegedly libelous re-
marks would undermine the basic purpose for which § 315 was
passed-full and unrestricted discussion of political issues by le-
gally qualified candidates." Id. at 529.)
1 See In Re Complaint by Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d 943
(1978) ("Finally, even if the Commission were to find the word
'nigger' to be 'obscene' or 'indecent,' in light of Section 315 we
may not prevent a candidate from utilizing that word during his
'use' of a licensee's broadcast facilities." Id. at 944); see also In
re Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act, Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079,
para. 25 (1978) ("All stations are forbidden by Section 315 of
the Communications Act from censoring any uses of a broadcast
station by a legally qualified candidate for public office and may
for political broadcasting from the indecent program-
ming statute works to the detriment of children who
were, ironically, the original intended beneficiaries of
the FCC's indecent programming policies. Finally,
this Comment urges the adoption of a policy more
sensitive to the special interests of children.
I. PRIOR LAW
A. Political Programming: Reasonable Access and
No-Censorship Provisions
In 1960, the FCC determined that political pro-
gramming was one of fourteen "major elements usu-
ally necessary to meet the public interest, needs and
desires of the community."116 To ensure that federal
candidates could avail themselves of the airwaves to
disseminate their message, section 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act was enacted. 7 This section of
the statute affords legally qualified candidates "rea-
sonable access" to broadcast media so they might
fully disseminate their message to the voting pub-
lic."s However, as the statute itself suggests, the right
of political candidates to use the airwaves has never
been absolute; it is only reasonable access which
must be provided by the broadcaster.
In 1978, almost two decades later, the FCC issued
not dictate the content or format of any non-exempt appearance
of such candidate." Id.). But see Memorandum to Letter from
Mark Fowler, Chairman, FCC, to Hon. Thomas A. Luken,
U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 19, 1984). See infra notes
42-43 and accompanying text.
16 1960 Programming Inquiry, supra note 1, at 2314. The
other elements recognized by the FCC include: (1) opportunity
for local self-expression, (2) the development and use of local
talent, (3) programs for children, (4) religious programs, (5)
educational programs, (6) public affairs programs, (7) editorial-
izations by licensees .... (9) agricultural programs, (1) [sic]
news programs, (11) weather and market reports, (12) sports
programs, (13) service to minority groups, (14) entertainment
programs.
Id.
17 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988). This section reads in rele-
vant part:
(a) The Commission may revoke any station license or
construction permit-
(7) For willful or repeated failure to afford reason-
able access to or permit the purchase of reasonable
amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting sta-
tion by a legally qualified candidate for Federal
elective office on behalf of his candidacy.
Id.
Is Id.
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a Report and Order"9 ("1978 Report and Order")
outlining its policies concerning section
312(a)(7)-the reasonable access provisions of the
Communications Act.2" The Commission reaffirmed
its policy of allowing licensees broad discretion to de-
termine which time slots would be available to which
candidates, and what constituted "reasonable ac-
cess." 21 The FCC recognized that "there may [also]
be circumstances when a licensee might reasonably
refuse broadcast time to political candidates during
certain parts of the broadcast day,"'2 2 although spe-
cific examples were not given.
In CBS, Inc. v. FCC23 ("CBS"), the Supreme
Court gave judicial approval to the 1978 Report and
Order. The Court affirmed a candidate's specific
right of reasonable access to broadcast stations in
furtherance of her candidacy and also delineated pos-
sible limitations on section 312(a)(7) access.24 In de-
termining what was in fact "reasonable," the Court
suggested guidelines licensees might employ such as:
burden on regular programming, amount of equal
time requests from all candidates, amount of access
already afforded a specific candidate, notice given by
a candidate, whether a candidate is in fact legally
qualified under the provisions of the Communica-
tions Act, and whether a campaign season has actu-
19 In re Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7)
of the Communications Act, Report and Order, 68 F.C.C.2d
1079 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Report and Order].
20 Id.
21 Id. paras. 40-41. Since the passage of section 312(a)(7) in
1971, the FCC's policy has been to defer to the reasonable, good
faith judgement of licensees as to what constitutes "reasonable
access" under all circumstances of a particular case. In the 1978
Report and Order, the Commission made clear its belief that
reasonable access required that legally qualified candidates be
afforded program time in prime time. Id. paras. 1, 40.
22 Id. para. 43.
22 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
24 Id. at 387.
25 Id. at 386-87.
28 Id. at 387.
27 In re Codification of the Commission's Political Program-
ming Policies, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 678 (1991) [here-
inafter 1991 Report and Order].
28 Id. para. 24 ("[slection 315(a) further stipulates that the
licensee shall have no power of censorship over material broad-
cast pursuant to these requirements." Id.).
29 Id. para. 1
20 Id. para. 4. With respect to its deference to broadcasters,
the Commission stated:
(A) Reasonable Access. Section 312(a)(7) requires stations
to afford reasonable access for federal candidates to their
facilities, or to permit federal candidates to purchase 'rea-
sonable amounts of time' In this regard the Commission
will:
(i) Continue to rely upon the reasonable good faith
ally commenced.25 The Court also stressed that if
licensees "act reasonably and in good faith, their de-
cisions will be entitled to deference even if the Com-
mission's analysis would have differed in the first
instance."2
In December 1991, the FCC issued a Report and
Order2" ("1991 Report and Order") that announced
and codified its political broadcasting regulations,
and wherein the FCC affirmed a candidate's right to
present uncensored political broadcasts. 8 The 1991
Report and Order was intended to be a comprehen-
sive guide to political broadcasting and supersede all
previous FCC interpretations of the political broad-
casting provisions of the Communications Act.2 9
Throughout the Commission's discussion of its
guidelines on reasonable access, equal opportunities
and lowest unit charge, the FCC reiterated its policy
of deference to the good faith judgment of broadcast-
ers-those deemed to be closest to the varying cir-
cumstances surrounding candidates' requests.30
Specifically, concerning reasonable access require-
ments, the FCC integrated and adopted the guide-
lines as first set out in the 1978 Report and Order
later affirmed by the Supreme Court in CBS.3 The
Commission emphasized that reasonable access was
not a set formula by which broadcasters and candi-
judgments of licensees to determine what constitutes
reasonable access.
(B) Equal Opportunities. Section 315(a) requires stations
that permit legally qualified candidates to use their station
to afford equal opportunities to the candidates' opponents.
Bona fide newscasts, as well as news interviews, docu-
mentaries, and news events, are exempt from these re-
quirements. In this regard the Commission will:
(iii) Continue to defer to licensees' reasonable, good
faith judgment in determining whether sufficient
sponsorship identifications have been provided in
political programming and advertising.
(v) Continue our present policy that permits sta-
tions to request candidates to submit their adver-
tisements in advance to allow the station to deter-
mine whether the ad constitutes a use by a
candidate and whether it complies with the spon-
sorship identification requirements. If a candidate
refuses to allow the station to pre-screen the ad, the
station should advise the candidate that it will take
whatever steps are necessary to add the appropriate
sponsorship identification to the submitted material.
Id. Similar flexibility was given to broadcasters with respect to
lowest unit charge. Lowest unit charge, section 315(b) of the
Communications Act, prohibits stations from charging candi-
dates more than the lowest unit charge of the station for each
class and period of time. Id.
"' Id. para. 9.
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dates might determine fixed time slots for political
programming to air. Rather, reasonable access was a
good faith determination by the broadcaster in light
of the surrounding circumstances, reviewable by the
FCC on a case-by-case basis. 2 The Commission
maintained that it would "defer to a licensee's dis-
cretion, and overturn a decision only if the licensee
has acted unreasonably pursuant to the established
guidelines."33
Section 312(a)(7), the Communication Act's rea-
sonable access provision,34 works in conjunction with
section 315(a) of the Communications Act to regu-
late political programming.35 Section 315 prohibits a
broadcaster from censoring the content of a political
candidate's announcement, regardless of offensive-
ness. 6 Therefore, once a broadcast licensee has de-
termined, in accordance with section 312(a)(7), that
a candidate has a right to reasonable access to the
airwaves, then that candidate ostensibly has an art-
ist's freedom to fill the empty canvas in any manner
she conceives. The provisions of section 315 have
generally been regarded as impervious, but not for
want of effort.
During the 1972 election year, the FCC was peti-
tioned by the Atlanta NAACP for a ruling allowing
television stations to refuse to air the political adver-
tisements of a senatorial candidate.37 The candidate,
Chairman of the National States Rights Party, ran
the following advertisement:
I am J. B. Stoner. I am the only candidate for U.S. Sena-
tor who is for the white people. I am the only candidate
who is against integration. All of the other candidates are
race mixers to one degree or another. I say we must re-
peal Gambrell's civil rights law. Gambrell's law takes jobs
from us whites and gives those jobs to the niggers. The
main reason why niggers want integration is because the
32 Id. paras. 8-9.
3 In re Request for Declaratory Ruling of National Assoc.
of Broadcasters Regarding Section 312(a)(7) of the Communica-
tions Act, Staff Ruling and Request for Public Comment, 7
FCC Rcd. 6880, para. 4 (1992). The National Association of
Broadcasters sought a general declaratory ruling by the FCC
that "broadcast stations need not provide legally qualified candi-
dates for federal office with program time in increments other
than those which the station ordinarily sells to commercial ad-
vertisers or which it ordinarily programs." Id. para. 1. At the
urging of the Democratic National Committee, the FCC invited
public comment on this issue, stressing, however, that reasonable
access issues such as those challenged here, were within the au-
thority of broadcasters in their good faith determinations. Id. pa-
ras. 1-2. The deadline for comments was January, 15, 1993, and
the deadline for reply comments was March 1, 1993. Id. para. 5.
3" 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988). See supra note 17 for text
of section.
" 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1988). See supra note 13 for text of
niggers want our white women. I am for law and order
with the knowledge that you cannot have law and order
and the niggers too. Vote white. This time vote your con-
victions by voting white racist J. B. Stoner into the run-
off election for U.S. Senator. Thank you.38
The NAACP argued that the content was inflam-
matory and posed an imminent threat to the public
safety and should therefore be censored.3 ' The FCC
found no factual basis to support these allegations
and, reasoning that the provisions of section 315 of
the Communications Act were absolute, held that the
stations were obligated to air the candidate's ads.4"
In so doing, the FCC affirmed the right of any le-
gally qualified candidate to unrestricted use of the
broadcast media regardless of public outcry against
the nature of its content.4"
Twelve years later, Congressman Thomas A.
Luken raised the potential statutory conflict between
section 1464 and section 315.42 Specifically, Luken
requested a ruling advising what the legal duties of
broadcast licensees were when a political candidate,
pursuant to her section 312(a)(7) and 315 rights, re-
quested air time for an advertisement containing ei-
ther obscene or indecent material. 3 In a memoran-
dum drafted in response ("Luken Memorandum"),
then-FCC Chairman Mark Fowler analyzed both
the legislative history of section 315 and the canons
of statutory construction.44 The Chairman first con-
cluded, based on a reading of the legislative history
of section 315, that Congress did not intend the sec-
tion to confer an immunity on candidates for federal
office from obscenity or indecency laws.45 This was
supported by the deletion from the original bill of an
amendment which relieved licensees from liability
for any uncensored material that violated criminal
section.
36 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a).
37 In re Complaint by Atlanta NAACP, Atl., Ga., Concern-
ing Section 315 Political Broadcast by J.B. Stoner, Request for
Ruling, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972).
38 Id. at 635-36.
39 Id. at 635.
40 Id. at 636-37.
41 Id.
42 Letter from Mark Fowler, Chairman, FCC, to Hon.
Thomas A. Luken, U.S. House of Representatives (Jan. 19,
1984) [hereinafter Luken Letter] (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus).
43 Memorandum to Letter from Mark Fowler, Chairman,
FCC, to Hon. Thomas A. Luken, U.S. House of Representa-
tives (Jan. 19, 1984) [hereinafter Luken Memorandum] (on file
with CommLaw Conspectus).
44 Id. at 2, 5.
45 Id. at 4.
[Vol. I
POLITICAL PROGRAMMING
laws.46
Second, Chairman Fowler concluded that the ca-
nons of statutory construction supported the determi-
nation that section 315 should not be interpreted to
supersede section 1464." To do so, the Chairman
stated, would render an unreasonable result, i.e.,
granting an exemption from the federal Criminal
Code to broadcasters and political candidates under
section 315 for content, which by definition, lacked
serious political value.4 In determining that section
315 did not grant an immunity from the provisions
of section 1464, the FCC stressed that "the exclusion
of obscene or indecent speech does not violate Section
315's purpose of fostering political debate. The spirit
of Section 315 is uncompromised by reading Section
1464 as an exception to Section 315's no-censorship
provision. ' '
49
B. The Indecency Standard: FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation and its Progeny
In 1978, the Supreme Court decided the landmark
case FCC v. Pacifica Foundation.50 The issue before
the Court was whether the FCC had the authority to
regulate non-political programming which was inde-
cent but not obscene.5 1 This case arose when a New
York radio station owned by Pacifica Foundation
broadcast the "Filthy Words" monologue of come-
dian George Carlin at two o'clock in the afternoon. 52
The FCC issued a Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der granting a complaint concerning the broadcast.53
Applying a nuisance principle, the FCC concluded
that
the concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the
41 Id. at 3-4.
17 Id. at 5.
46 Id. at 5-6.
49 Id. at 6.
" FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and
reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
51 Id. at 729.
82 Id. at 729-30.
" In re Citizen's Complaint against Pacifica Foundation
Station WBAI(FM), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56
F.C.C.2d 94, para. 11 (1975).
84 Id.
:5 Id. para. 14.
86 Id. See also Pacifica Foundation v. F.C.C., 556 F.2d 9, 11
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
" Pacifica Foundation v. F.C.C., 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
88 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 1008 (1978).
8 Id. at 734.
60 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988)
exposure of children to language that describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excre-
tory activities and organs, at times of the day when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience."
The FCC therefore held the two o'clock afternoon
broadcast of the monologue to be in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1464.55 Although a fine was not imposed
against Pacifica Foundation, the complaint did be-
come the impetus for the FCC to review and revise
its policies regarding indecent programming.56
On appeal by Pacifica Foundation, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the FCC's Memorandum Opinion
and Order.57 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari5 to review, inter alia, whether the
FCC's holding constituted censorship within section
326 of the Communications Act, and whether the
language violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464.51 Section 326 of
the Communications Act is a parallel provision to
section 315, prohibiting censorship by the FCC of
non-political broadcasting.6 0 Reviewing the legisla-
tive history, the Supreme Court held that section 326
was inapplicable to the prohibitions as outlined in 18
U.S.C. § 1464 on broadcasting obscene, indecent or
profane programming.6 Therefore, the Court held
that the channeling of programming which fell
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was not a
form of censorship; content of the programming re-
mained unchanged, only the time of day when it
might be broadcast was restricted.62
Having determined that the FCC could regulate
such broadcasting, the Court then reviewed the FCC
determination that the Carlin monologue was inde-
reads:
[niothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to
give the Commission the power of censorship over the ra-
dio communications or signals transmitted by any radio
station, and no regulation or condition shall be promul-
gated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
Id.
61 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 737-38.
62 Id. at 735-38. The Court stated:
[t]he prohibition against censorship unequivocally denies
the Commission any power to edit proposed broadcasts in
advance and to excise material considered inappropriate
for the airwaves. The prohibition, however, has never
been construed to deny the Commission the power to re-
view the content of completed broadcasts in the perform-
ance of its regulatory duties.
Id. at 735.
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cent per 18 U.S.C. § 1464.63 Upon review, the
Court affirmed the FCC's judgment that each of the
indecency elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 were satis-
fied. 4 In its conclusion, the Court outlined a two-
tiered standard for determining whether content is
indecent. As a threshold matter, content must first,
on its face, refer to sexual or excretory functions.
Second, the context surrounding the alleged inde-
cency violation must render, rather than excuse, the
programming actionable.6 5 In a concurrence, Justices
Powell and Blackmun characterized Carlin's repeti-
tious use of his seven "Filthy Words" as "verbal
shock treatment. "66
The plurality opinion also legitimized the govern-
ment's policy objectives of protecting children from
this nature of programming. 7 Recognizing that the
broadcast media are "uniquely pervasive" 68 in our
homes as well as "uniquely accessible to our chil-
dren,"6 9 the Court justified the FCC's regulation of
indecent programming to protect the nation's chil-
dren." The Court also stated that prior advisory
warnings were not sufficient to protect children: "To
say that one may avoid further offense by turning off
the radio when he hears indecent language is like
saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away
after the first blow."' Protection of children there-
fore "amply justiqies] special treatment of indecent
broadcasting."7 2
In 1987, the FCC evidently determined that the
Pacifica indecency standard was too narrowly drawn
63 Id. at 738-39.
84 Id. at 741.
65 Id. at 750. The Court also stated:
lilt is appropriate, in conclusion, to emphasize the nar-
rowness of our holding. This case does not involve a two-
way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dis-
patcher, or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy. We have
not decided that an occasional expletive in either setting
would justify any sanction or, indeed, that this broadcast
would justify a criminal prosecution. The Commission's
decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under
which context is all-important.
Id.
66 Id. at 757 (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring).
67 Id. at 749-50. The Court stated:
[B]roadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even
those too young to read .... Other forms of offensive ex-
pression may be withheld from the young without restrict-
ing the expression at its source. Bookstores and motion
picture theaters, for example, may be prohibited from
making indecent material available to children. We held
in Ginsberg v. New York that the government's interest in
the 'well-being of its youth' and in supporting 'parents'
claim to authority in their own household' justified the
regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease
with which children may obtain access to broadcast mate-
and required review. In three matters before the
FCC, programming which would not otherwise have
been held indecent under the Pacifica standard was
held to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1464."' The FCC ex-
plained that the repetitive use of the words identified
in Pacifica was not inclusive of other material which
might also be patently offensive, according to com-
munity standards, and therefore indecent.74 Later in
1987, the FCC issued a Memorandum Opinion and
Order75 ("1987 Memorandum") outlining the ap-
propriate application of the standard, as well as de-
termining that the risk of children in the broadcast
audience would be minimized after midnight, rather
than at the previous hour of ten o'clock p.m. 76 Con-
sequently, indecent programming became actionable
when broadcast outside the "safe harbor" hours of
midnight to six o'clock a.m. 77
In Action For Children's Television v. FCC78
("ACT I"), petitioners sought review of the FCC's
1987 Memorandum, challenging the FCC's indecent
programming standard on vagueness and over-
breadth grounds, as well as challenging the delinea-
tion of "safe harbor" hours.79 Petitioners argued that
there was no rationale for altering the Pacifica stan-
dard and that its vagueness constricted broadcasters'
programming choices.8" Petitioners also argued that
the standard was overbroad because it did not allow
for programming which necessarily must contain in-
decent references, yet still had redeeming social or
scientific merit sufficient to withstand sanctions.8
rial, coupled with concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply
justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Id. (citations omitted).
68 Id. at 748.
69 Id. at 749.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 748-49.
72 Id. at 750.
73 See In re Pacifica Foundation, Licensee of Station
KPFK(FM), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd.
2698, para. 1 (1987); In re The Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
Licensee of Station KCSB(FM), Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2703, para. 4 (1987); In re Infinity Brdcst.
Corp. of Pa., Licensee of Station WYSP(FM), Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2705, para. 12 (1987) [herein-
after Infinity of Pa.).
74 See, e.g., Infinity of Pa., supra note 73, para. 9.
75 1987 Order, supra note 10.
716 Id. paras. 27 n. 47, 29.
77 Id.
7' Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
79 Id. at 1334, 1336.
80 Id. at 1338.
81 Id. at 1339-40.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit sided with the FCC and denied petitioners'
vagueness and overbreadth challenges, recognizing
that a generic definition of indecency, decided on a
case-by-case basis, was necessary to ensure the FCC
could achieve its child protection objectives.82
The court, however, agreed with petitioners' argu-
ment that the safe harbor hours of midnight to six
o'clock a.m. were arbitrarily drawn and without fac-
tual support.8 3 This issue was therefore remanded to
the FCC for reconsideration. 4 Before the FCC
could act on the court's remand, President Bush
signed an appropriations bill containing a rider
prohibiting the broadcast of indecent material
twenty-four hours a day, thereby eliminating safe
harbor hours altogether.85 The FCC subsequently
issued an Order in compliance with the provisions of
the rider that totally barred indecent material from
the airwaves."6
In Action For Children's Television v. FCC 7
("ACT II"), ACT I petitioners brought an action
requesting review of the FCC's Order."8 A panel of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
granted a motion to stay enforcement of the ban
pending the outcome of its review. 89 Before the court
ruled on the issues in ACT II, the Supreme Court
decided Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC."0 This decision led the FCC to conclude that if
it could show that the twenty-four hour ban on inde-
cent programming was the only measure that would
guarantee enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1464, then it
would withstand judicial scrutiny.9 After soliciting
82 Id. at 1340.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1341.
88 Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988) ("By
January 31, 1989, the Federal Communications Commission
shall promulgate regulations in accordance with section 1464, ti-
tle 18, United States Code, to enforce the provisions of such sec-
tion on a 24 hour per day basis." Id.) (repealed by the Public
Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356 §16(b),
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 949, 954). See infra note 96 and
accompanying text.
88 In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Ob-
scenity and Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Order, 4 FCC Rcd.
457, para. 2 (1988) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (1992))
[hereinafter Enforcement of § 14641.
8 Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504
(D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1281 (1992).
8s Id. at 1507.
88 Id.
so Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989) (holding blanket ban on indecent commercial telephone
message services unconstitutional where alternative measures
would effectuate government interests).
" Action For Children's Television, 932 F.2d at 1507.
public comment, the FCC issued a Report9 2 reaf-
firming its contention that the twenty-four hour-per-
day ban was the only method that would "effectuate
the government's compelling interest in protecting
children from broadcast indecency." 93
When the court of appeals finally reviewed the
FCC's Report, it struck down the ban on the basis of
its holding in ACT I-that indecency, but not ob-
scenity, was afforded First Amendment protection as
long as it was channeled to times that reasonably
protected children from such programming. 4 The
court once again remanded to the FCC the task of
delineating safe harbor hours for indecent program-
ming.95 However, in August 1992, President Bush
signed the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992
in which Congress delineated safe harbor hours. 96
And in September 1992, the FCC issued a Notice of
Proposed Rule Making announcing proceedings
aimed at implementing the congressionally mandated
safe harbor hours.9 7
II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Non-Political Broadcasting Violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1464
In recent months the FCC has issued opinions il-
luminating its current position regarding indecent
programming. In February 1992, the FCC fined a
South Carolina radio station $3,750.00 for violating
82 In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast In-
decency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Report of the Commission, 5 FCC
Rcd. 5297, 5297 (1990) (proceeding terminated).
83 Action for Children's Television, 932 F.2d at 1507.
84 Id. at 1508-09.
85 Id. at 1510.
88 Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-356, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (106 Stat.) 949. The following sec-
tion of the Act delineates the current safe harbor hours:
BROADCASTING OF INDECENT
PROGRAMMING
SEC. 16. (a) FCC REGULATIONS. - The Federal Com-
munications Commission shall promulgate regulations to
prohibit the broadcasting of indecent programming -
(1) between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. on any day by
any public radio station or public television station
that goes off the air at or before 12 midnight; and
(2) between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight on any day
for any radio or television broadcasting station not
described in paragraph (1).
Id. at 954.
9' In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast In-
decency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
7 FCC Rcd. 6464, 6464 (1992).
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18 U.S.C. § 1464.98 At approximately nine o'clock
in the morning, two announcers at station
WYBB(FM) carried on a conversation during which
the word "crap" was used repetitiously to heighten
the one-time use of the word "shit."99 Following the
nuisance rationale of Pacifica, the FCC held that the
single occurrence of the word "shit" was "patently
offensive language concerning excretory activities
and occurred at a time of day . . .when children
were likely to have been in the listening audience,"
and thus violated the indecency standard.'00 This
holding highlighted the interdependency of the actual
offensive act with the surrounding circumstances in
indecency determinations. Just as the Court stated in
its conclusion in Pacifica, the incidental use of the
word "shit" alone might not have necessarily in-
duced sanctions from the FCC; its use, however,
under circumstances structured to place extra atten-
tion and focus on the word rendered it actionable. °'
Two subsequent FCC decisions further highlight
the current application of the indecency standard. In
s Stewart Letter, supra note 6.
Id. at 1595-96. The following excerpt was appended to
the Stewart Letter and represents the violative indecent material:
[MV: Male Voice
MV2: Second Male Voice]
MV: (Unintelligible) Maybe it's nine.
MV2: I don't know and who really gives a crap?
MV: Oh, oh.
MV2: No, we can say crap.
MV: We can say crap?
MV2: Yeah.
MV: Crap, crap, crap, crap, crap, crap.
MV2: That's right, just can't say shit.
MV: Oh, then we won't.
MV2: That's right.
Id.
I00 Id.
101 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
102 In re Application of Zapis Communications Corp.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 3888, para. 1
(1992).
103 Id. para. 5.
104 Id. para. 4. The Court stated:
[Tihe Commission considers whether the broadcast mate-
rial is 'indecent,' i.e., if it depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive as measured by contemporary commu-
nity standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excre-
tory activities and organs. Broadcast of indecent material
is actionable if the broadcast occurs at a time when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.
No terms are per se indecent, and words or phrases that
may be patently offensive in one context may not rise to
the level of actionable indecency in another context.
Therefore, to determine whether particular material is in-
decent, we must have sufficient information to examine
both the language used and its context.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
June 1992, Zapis Communications filed for renewal
of its broadcast license and had to overcome a citi-
zen's Petition to Deny that alleged several incidents
of indecent programming.0 2 Although the FCC held
that the complainant provided insufficient detail re-
garding content and air times to sustain a finding of
indecency,' 0 3 it did offer a comprehensive definition
of the indecency standard in current application.'0
Next, in July 1992, the FCC fined a San Francisco
radio station $25,000 after the FCC determined that
disc jockey Rick Chase's afternoon program repeat-
edly contained sexually explicit material.' 0 5
It would be another repeat offender, however, who
would manage to draw the largest fine ever imposed
for broadcast indecency by the FCC. In December
1992, in a trenchant opinion, the FCC levied a
$600,000 fine against three radio stations (collec-
tively referred to as "Infinity") for broadcasting
"shock-jock" Howard Stern's radio program that the
FCC determined contained indecent material.' 06 The
unprecedented fine was imposed because of the ap-
109 Letter from FCC to San Fran. Century Broadcasting,
supra note 6.
1o6 See Infinity, supra note 6. The three fined radio stations
that aired a simulcast of the "Howard Stern Show" are:
WYSP(FM), Philadelphia, PA; WXRK(FM), New York, NY;
and WJFK(FM), Manassas, VA. The FCC attached transcripts
from Howard Stern's program used in its indecency determina-
tion. The following excerpt is an example of the material
deemed indecent by the FCC:
November 25, 1991
[HS: Howard Stern
RQ: Robin Quivers
FV: Female Voice]
HS: I think that's a real act of perversion to, to mastur-
bate in a public place. I, even though it is an X-rated
theatre.
FV: It was a triple-X rated theatre.
HS: Whatever, I've been to that triple-X rated theatre
and I'm going to tell you something, I've been to a lot of
triple-X rated theatres.
FV: Now, I've never been to one.
HS: Now let me tell you something.
FV: Now aren't there people in there doing that?
HS: Ah, once in awhile you'll sit down and some guy will
be doing it, and you say to yourself, you know it's a sexy
movie but do I want some guy shooting his love gunk all
over me?
FV: (Laughs)
HS: I mean, it's indecent. What I would do is I'd go
watch the movie, then when I go home I would mastur-
bate. I'd be too embarrassed to masturbate there in the
theatre.
FV: Yeah.
HS: I have a certain civility about me.
FV: I see.
HS: A certain "Je ne sais quoi."
RQ: Let me ask you another question.
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parent disregard by Infinity and Howard Stern for
the FCC's channeling policies as evidenced by the
pattern of repeated indecency offenses." 7 In two
concurring opinions, FCC Commissioners signaled
their frustration with the necessity to enforce the in-
decency standard through the use of fines and indi-
cated their willingness to revoke licenses if child pro-
tection devices such as channeling continue to be
ignored.' 8 Contrasting the Infinity fine with those
issued earlier in 1992, this message is likely to be
received loud and clear. However, it is also likely
that the indecency standard will continue to be tested
until the FCC actually revokes a license on these
grounds.
The aforementioned examples illustrate the cur-
rent application of the indecency standard as well as
the continued inclusion of and reliance on the sur-
rounding circumstances and context of the alleged vi-
olations by the Commission in its review of inde-
cency complaints. Also exhibited is the FCC's
continued readiness to act in loco parentis to aid par-
ents in protecting children from language which vio-
lates 18 U.S.C. § 1464. The FCC's insistence in
furthering this compelling government interest was
particularly displayed in the Howard Stern opinion,
by the amount of the fine as well as the implied
threats of license revocation for those broadcasters
who continue to ignore the indecency standard.
These examples of the FCC's indecency policy re-
garding commercial speech lie in sharp contrast to
the debate surrounding the application of the same
standard to political broadcasting.
FV: I don't know what?
HS: Yeah.
FV: He does. I don't know what.
RQ: But ah.
FV: But you also stop masturbating when your wife
comes in the room.
HS: Of course.
RQ: So he doesn't do it in front of anybody.
HS: Right.
FV: You don't do it in front anybody even though.
HS: Well, that's for a very personal reason, I don't want
my wife to think I'm some kind of pervert.
Id. at LEXIS 31-32.
107 The FCC stated:
In determining the amount of the forfeitures, we have
carefully considered the apparent pattern of indecent
broadcasting exhibited by Infinity over a substantial pe-
riod since our initial indecency warning to Infinity in
1987 for Howard Stern material carried by WYSP(FM).
The clear notice afforded by the 1987 warning and
the substantial similarity of the material cited then and
here render this intervening pattern of apparent miscon-
duct particularly troubling. Under these circumstances, we
B. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 Challenges to Political
Programming
During the 1992 political season, Republican con-
gressional candidate Michael Bailey formulated ad-
vertisements containing images of graphic aborted fe-
tuses.1 " The purpose behind the broadcast of the ads
was clear-Bailey stated that his intention was to
"horrify" viewers to the realities of abortion." 0
Knowing that his decision to run for office gave him
a "tremendous platform from which to speak,''
111
Bailey willfully used sections 312(a)(7) and 315 of
the Communications Act as a shield to visually shock
viewers without regard to community standards of
good taste." 2 Parents of child viewers were appalled
at the airing of the ads. The mother of Sean Meyers,
who became hysterical after viewing one of these
ads, stated "[i]t's an adult topic, not a child topic.
This shouldn't be shown when children should be
watching.""-' Ms. Meyers echoes the current com-
munity standard approach which channels adult top-
ics to later broadcast times. But perhaps it is Bailey
himself who best enunciated the controversy: "When
something is so horrifying that we can't stand to look
at it, then why are we tolerating it?""' 4
In an effort to stop the dissemination of these po-
litical advertisements, two separate Petitions for De-
claratory Ruling ("Petitions") were filed with the
FCC."' Petitioners were Gillett Communications
("Gillett"), an Atlanta television station and Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler ("Kaye,
Scholer"), a law firm representing several unnamed
television and radio stations."' Both petitioners of-
believe it is appropriate to impose a monetary penalty
substantially higher than that suggested by our Policy
Statement on Standards for Assessing Forfeitures....
Id. at LEXIS 3-4 (citations omitted).
10 Commissioners Quello and Duggan, concurring in the
FCC determination, each offered separate statements underscor-
ing their commitment to enforcing the child protective channel-
ling policy. See Infinity, supra note 6.
"09 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. See infra
note 112.
11 Booth, supra note 2, at Al ("I knew that if we could ever
show an aborted baby on TV, we could horrify people ... .")Id.
.11 Media: Sides Dispute Effects of "Graphic" Ads, AMERI-
CAN POLITICAL NETWORK, Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library.
... Candidate's 'Hitler' Ad Equates Holocaust, Abortion,
UPI, Aug. 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File ("If offending people was what I was worried about I
wouldn't have been running for Congress .. .
"' Nightline, supra note 2.
114 Id.
110 See Gillett, supra note 7.
118 Id. at 5599.
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fered several arguments: first, that the section
312(a)(7) reasonable access requirements were not
absolute; second, on a nuisance rationale, that these
images were outside community standards for televi-
sion broadcast times accessible to children; third, that
the use of graphic aborted fetuses constituted inde-
cent programming; and finally, despite previous in-
terpretations, that channeling these images to times
when the risk that children would be viewers would
be minimal was consistent with section 315 of the
Communications Act." 7 Unlike Gillett who submit-
ted a specific advertisement for review, Kaye, Scholer
requested a general ruling allowing its clients to
channel to safe harbor hours those ads that in their
good faith determinations violated indecency
standards." 8
In a consolidated letter denying both Petitions, the
FCC examined the issue in three parts: first,
whether the FCC could issue a general ruling; sec-
ond, whether reasonable access requirements prohib-
ited channeling (for whatever reason) of political
broadcasting; and, finally, whether the use of graphic
aborted fetuses in these advertisements was within
the indecency definition of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and
therefore subject to regulation." 9
Despite the fact that Gillett submitted a videotape
of a specific advertisement containing images of the
class of programming in dispute, the FCC first es-
tablished that decisions had to be determined on the
traditional case-by-case basis rather than issuing a
general ruling (as requested by Kaye, Scholer) ban-
ning graphic aborted fetuses as a class of program-
ming. 20 Next, the FCC decided that the section
312(a)(7) reasonable access requirements were para-
mount to any channeling initiatives, regardless of
whether the channeling was for an indecency policy
or a content-neutral policy.' The FCC maintained
that regardless of the impetus, channeling of a politi-
cal candidate's advertisement would impinge on her
ability to disseminate the campaign's message, there-
fore violating section 312(a)(7).' 2 2 Finally, the FCC
117 Gillett posed the following question in its Petition for
Declaratory Ruling "Whether a licensee may channel a use by
a legally qualified candidate to a safe harbor when children are
not generally present in the audience if the licensee determines
in good faith that the proposed use is indecent or otherwise un-
suitable for children." Id. at 5599. With its Petition for Declara-
tory Ruling, Gillett submitted a videotape of a specific advertise-
ment depicting an aborted fetus for the Commission's review. Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 5599-600.
10 Id. at 5599. A general ruling "would be inconsistent with
the Commission's long-held view that indecency determinations
must be based on the specific factual context in which the alleg-
examined whether the images complained of actually
constituted indecent programming within the mean-
ing of section 1464. Using the indecency standard
identified in Pacifica, the Commission held that
bloodied fetal tissue aborted from a human body did
not constitute "excrement" as defined by Webster's
Dictionary.'2 3 Because the FCC did not reach the
question of whether these images were in fact inde-
cent, the Commission did not directly address the is-
sue of whether material defined as indecent under
section 1464 could be channeled without violating
the provisions of sections 312(a)(7) and 315 of the
Communications Act. However, the FCC did note
that if it had made such a determination, then an
analysis would have been warranted under the
Luken Memorandum.'2 4
The FCC did offer advice to broadcasters to mini-
mize any negative effects that might occur in airing
the advertisements. The Commission proposed the
following viewer advisory be aired immediately prior
to the broadcast of an advertisement containing
graphic images: "The following political advertise-
ment contains scenes which may be disturbing to
children. Viewer discretion is advised."'2 5 The FCC
determined that such an advisory "represent[s] a rea-
sonable accommodation" between the competing in-
terests of political and children's programming.12
6
After this decision was handed down, Kaye,
Scholer petitioned the FCC for reconsideration. 2 7 In
its Application for Review, Kaye, Scholer advanced
several arguments: first, that broadcasters who make
good faith determinations that the content of a politi-
cal announcement is outside contemporary commu-
nity standards be permitted to channel the broadcast
to a safe harbor time period without violating sec-
tions 312(a)(7) or 315;128 second, that the FCC erred
in its determination that the use of graphic aborted
fetuses did not constitute "excretory activity" under
the Pacifica standard; 2 9 and third, that the viewer
advisories aired prior to political advertisements con-
taining graphic aborted fetuses were insufficient to
edly offensive material appears." Id.
121 Id. at 5599-600.
122 Id. at 5600.
123 Id. at 5600 n.2.
114 Id. at 5600 n.3.
125 Id. at 5600.
126 Id.
127 In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section
312(a)(7) of the Communications Act (Kaye, Scholer), Erratum
to Application for Review, (Sept. 2, 1992) (on file with Com-
mLaw Conspectus.
2I Id. at 5.
129 Id. at 11.
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protect children.' 3 0 In response, the FCC issued a
Public Notice requesting comments to aid in its re-
evaluation of these "extremely difficult questions."''
III. DETERMINING AN EFFECTIVE
POLICY
The Gillett letter ruling and the FCC's subse-
quent request for public comments raise the possibil-
ity of reformulation of public policy that will be
more sensitive to the special interests of children. In
determining an effective policy choice which balances
the competing interests of political candidates with
the non-electorate, the Commission should consider,
inter alia, the following issues: whether graphic
aborted fetuses-consistent with current applications
of the indecency standard-do in fact constitute inde-
cent programming regulable under section 1464;
whether viewer advisories constitute a "reasonable
accommodation" to the interests of parents and chil-
dren, and not just to the candidates and broadcasters;
whether material which is not indecent but otherwise
harmful to children may be channeled by broadcast-
ers in their good faith determinations; and whether a
political candidate is able to disseminate her message
effectively to the electorate without resorting to inde-
cent programming outside safe harbor hours.
A. Graphic Aborted Fetuses as Indecent
Programming
The FCC misapplied the current indecency stan-
dard in determining that the graphic aborted fetuses
did not constitute indecent programming. The
Pacifica decision outlined a two-step test for deter-
mining whether a broadcast is indecent: first,
whether the disputed material on its face violates 18
U.S.C. § 1464; and, second, whether the disputed
material was presented in such a context that ren-
ders it indecent.' 3 2 In its Gillett letter ruling, the
FCC incorrectly applied the first level of this two-
tier analysis and completely ignored the second level.
130 Id. at 15.
3I In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section
312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, Public Notice and Re-
quest for Comments, 7 FCC Rcd. 7297, para. 3 (1992). The
FCC requested public comments
on all issues concerning what, if any, right or obligation a
broadcast licensee has to channel political advertisements
that it reasonably and in good faith believes are indecent.
[The FCC] also seek[s] comment as to whether broadcast-
ers have any right to channel material that, while not in-
decent, may be otherwise harmful to children.
In the first part of its analysis, the Commission anal-
ogized aborted fetal matter to "excrement" according
to a definition from Webster's Dictionary. 3 Based
on this flawed premise, the FCC determined that
aborted fetal tissue did not fall within the Pacifica
standard. Rather than examine the definition of "ex-
crement," the FCC should have directed its attention
to the specific language of the standard articulated in
Pacifica, i.e., "excretory or sexual activities." In the
same dictionary, "excretory" is defined as "of, relat-
ing to, or functioning in excretion.""'xa "Excretion" is
defined as "the act or process of excreting; something
excreted; especially useless, superfluous, or harmful
material . . . that is eliminated from the body and
that differs from a secretion in not being produced to
perform a useful function."' 35 And "excrete" is de-
fined as "to sift out, discharge . . . to separate and
eliminate or discharge . . . from the blood or tissues
or from the active protoplasm."' 3' 6 Having only ex-
amined the meaning of "excrement" as fecal mat-
ter,'37 the FCC erred in not classifying aborted fetal
tissue within excretory activity because it may be
classified as tissue which has been sifted out, dis-
charged and separated from the body. A similar de-
termination could have been made if the FCC had
examined whether aborted fetal tissue may be classi-
fied as "sexual activity." Again, in the same Web-
ster's dictionary employed by the FCC, "sexual" is
defined as "of, relating to, or associated with sex or
the sexes ... having or involving sex <'-reproduc-tio."18 Clearly abortions and fetuses are related to
sex and reproduction.
The second level of the analysis is whether the
context in which the material is presented renders
the material indecent. Because the FCC determined
that the images failed to meet the requirements of
the first tier, as a threshold matter, it did not ex-
amine the surrounding circumstances of these images
in its determination of indecency. If the FCC had
reached the second tier, it could not have ignored the
clamoring of voices eager to enunciate the offensive-
ness of these ads. Both television stations and the
FCC received numerous complaints regarding the
Id. Comments were due on or before January 22, 1993, and re-
ply comments were due on or before February 23, 1993.
132 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
131 See Gillett, supra note 7, at 5600 n. 2.
"3 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY,
433 (1985).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1079.
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nature of these advertisements. Even the political
candidates themselves stated that their intention was
to show horrifying images to the broadcast audience
in an attempt to shock the viewers into casting votes
in their favor. The candidates deliberately used a
loophole in the indecency laws to "sneak" shocking
images into citizens' homes. It is illogical that the
FCC would overlook the public, the licensees, and
the proponents of these ads in making its indecency
determination. These are the very people qualified to
put the images into context for the FCC and deter-
mine community standards of indecency.
Although the encouragement by the FCC to use
viewer advisories to warn children of potentially dis-
turbing images should be applauded for its recogni-
tion that this class of programming is inappropriate
for children, the effectiveness of these warnings is
questionable and begs for a permanent policy change
which would protect children from these images alto-
gether. The effectiveness of an advisory such as the
one suggested by the FCC in the Gillett letter ruling
is dependent on many variables: first, whether the
viewers will actually tune in in time to see the advi-
sory before the commercial airs; second, whether the
children are supervised by an adult decision-maker;
third, if unsupervised, whether the children will be
able to read visual warnings or understand audio
ones; and fourth, if unsupervised, whether children
will have the foresight to actually avoid the poten-
tially disturbing images or be so titillated by the
warning that their interest is only enhanced. Even
prior to the age of the remote control, the Pacifica
Court doubted the effectiveness of such advisory
warnings.' 39 The characterization of graphic aborted
fetuses as indecent programming and the adoption of
a policy to channel political programming which is
indecent would eliminate the foregoing outlined
problems and would be more sensitive to the special
interests of children.
"9 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
141 See id.
142 See 1991 Report and Order, supra note 27.
141 Children's Television Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437,
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 996 (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 303a (Supp. 1992)).
144 Id. The law reads in pertinent part
TITLE I - REGULATION OF CHILDREN'S TEL-
EVISION FINDINGS
SEC. 101. The Congress finds that -
(4) special safeguards are appropriate to protect
children from overcommercialization on television;
(5) television station operators and licensees
B. Graphic Aborted Fetuses As Harmful
Programming
If the FCC determines that the use of graphic
aborted fetuses does not constitute indecent program-
ming, then another avenue remains for the FCC and
broadcasters to channel these images. In its decisions
regarding reasonable access requirements, the FCC
continually underscores its deference to the good
faith determinations of broadcasters in resolving
when to air political ads. 4 Using a parallel nui-
sance rationale as articulated in Pacifica and its
progeny, broadcasters should be allowed to consider
community standards of good taste and offensiveness
to determine whether the content of a political adver-
tisement may be harmful to children. Using a good
faith determination, the broadcaster may then chan-
nel such harmful ads to times when children are un-
likely to be in the viewing audience. Thus, the non-
electorate would be protected from harmful images
aimed at inducing voting adults to cast ballots based
on the targeted matter.
A broadcaster already possesses the means to
make this determination: First, the broadcaster may
review an advertisement before its airing pursuant to
determining equal opportunities; 4' second, the can-
didate does not have an absolute right to the time
slot of her choosing, but must defer (as does the
FCC) to the determination of the broadcaster as to
when the advertisement will air; 42 and finally, ma-
terial which is not indecent but still deemed harmful
to children is already channeled or banned from the
airwaves, and it gives valid precedent for broadcast-
ers to channel the images discussed here.
The Children's Television Act of 19904" is a non-
content based attempt to structure children's pro-
gramming to better serve their interests, and specifi-
cally to protect children from overcommercialization
on television." Time limits are imposed by the law
should follow practices in connection with chil-
dren's television programming and advertising that
take into consideration the characteristics of this
child audience;
STANDARDS FOR CHILDREN'S TELEVI-
SION PROGRAMMING
SEC. 102. (b) Except as provided in subsection (c), the
standards prescribed under subsection (a) shall include the
requirement that each commercial television broadcast li-
censee shall limit the duration of advertising in children's
television programming to not more than 10.5 minutes per
hour on weekends and not more than 12 minutes per hour
on weekdays.
Id. at 996-97.
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on the amount of advertising allowed during chil-
dren's programming. 145 Congress justified these spe-
cial guidelines because of the amount of time spent
by children in front of the television set, the suscepti-
bility of children to commercial pitches, and the spe-
cial interest the State has in protecting children.'
4 6
In the spring of 1991, the FCC issued a Report and
Order 47 implementing the provisions of the 1990
law. Clearly excessive advertising during program-
ming when children were likely to be in the viewing
audience was deemed harmful and capable of regula-
tion through public policy and Commission rules.
Appalled at the amount of violence shown during
hours when children were likely to be in the viewing
audience, Senator Paul Simon of Illinois sponsored a
bill the ultimate goal of which was to affect broad-
cast content.1 48 Passed into law in 1990, the Televi-
sion Program Improvement Act conferred an exemp-
tion from antitrust laws upon the television industry
for joint discussions aimed at curbing violence on tel-
evision.149 In December 1992, ABC, CBS and NBC
issued programming standards committed to alleviat-
ing "gratuitous or excessive portrayals of vio-
lence.' 5 0 Of particular note are standards 4, 5, 9
and 11, which deplore violent images whose intent is
to shock, images portraying "excessive gore," images
in which children are victims, and images which
may be "unduly frightening or distressing to
children.1 5 '
1
These standards reflect what has long been recog-
nized in academia. Over 3,000 articles have been
written on the effects of television on children and
society as a whole.'52 Congress, academia and the
television industry have all determined that, in the
best interests of children, content which is harmful
14 5 Id.
148 H.R. REP. No. 385, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5, 6, 8, re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1605, 1609, 1610, 1612-13.
"" In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Televi-
sion Programming, Report and Order, 6 FCC Rcd. 2111, 2111
(1991).
148 Paul Simon, A Message from Sen. Paul Simon (D-Ill.),
Chief Sponsor, Television Violence Act, VIOLENCE ON TELEVI-
SION at 15 [hereinafter Simon Message] (on file with CommLaw
Conspectus).
' Television Program Improvement Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-650, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 5128 (codified at
47 U.S.C. § 303c (Supp. 1992)).
150 ABC, CBS and NBC, Standards for the Depiction of Vi-
olence in Television Programs, (Dec., 1992) (on file with Com-
mLaw Conspectus).
', Id. The four guidelines in full are:
4) Depictions of violence may not be used to shock or
stimulate the audience.
5) Scenes showing excessive gore, pain or physical suffer-
but not necessarily indecent should be subject to reg-
ulation. In a sense, the three networks are using a
nuisance rationale to self-regulate program content.
Unless a measure is adopted by Congress or the
FCC, during the next political season these stan-
dards will be in direct conflict with political adver-
tisements containing graphic aborted fetuses.153
If the FCC adopts either an indecency or harmful
test in the political programming arena, the question
remains whether the ability of political candidates to
convey their messages to the public will be impaired.
Other avenues are available, even on the volatile is-
sue of abortion, for political candidates to drive their
messages home to the electorate with equal force
during safe harbor hours. For example, a pro-choice
candidate does not have to resort to graphically en-
larging a photo of a woman's cervix with a hanger
piercing it to remind voters of the nature of back al-
ley abortions. A hanger with a red slash through it
signifying the candidate's opposition to its use is also
a forceful image, and is one that does not subject
children to potentially indecent or harmful images. It
also allows parents to decide how much or how little
of an explanation they wish to give their child on the
symbolism represented by the advertisement. Politi-
cal candidates, after the safe harbor hours, may then
broadcast advertisements without regard to content.
This Comment urges reversal of the Gillett letter
ruling and the articulation of a political program-
ming policy more sensitive to those too young to vote.
Classification of graphic aborted fetuses as either in-
decent or harmful material, and the requirement that
these images be channeled, regardless of the status of
the proponent of the images, is more sensitive to the
special interests of children. The FCC should review
ing are not acceptable.
9) Exceptional care must be taken in stories or scenes
where children are victims of, or are threatened by acts of
violence (physical, psychological or verbal).
11) Realistic portrayals of violence as well as scenes,
images or events which are unduly frightening or distres-
sing to children should not be included in any program
specifically designed for that audience.
Id.
152 Simon Message, supra note 148, at 15. See also Brandon
S. Centerwall, Television and Violence: The Scale of the Prob-
lem and Where to Go From Here, 267 JAMA 3059 (1992).
151 See Jason Vest, Campaigner in the Pit Bull Pulpit,
WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1993, at Dl, D8 (detailing Michael Bai-
ley's return to the political arena as a campaign manager with
the intent to formulate more graphic ads to be aired on the
broadcast media.).
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complaints--either from those candidates whose ads
have been channeled or from the public who have
viewed these ads outside safe harbor
hours-deferring to the reasonable good faith deter-
minations of broadcasters. In those cases where a
broadcaster has unreasonably censored or restricted
access of a candidate's advertisement, the FCC may
then impose a fine similar to the forfeitures imposed
in Notices of Apparent Liability in indecency pro-
ceedings. Adopting such a policy is more sensitive to
the special interests of children while still allowing a
candidate opportunity to express her message to the
public.
IV. CONCLUSION
Denial of the Gillett Communications and Kaye,
Scholer Petitions is in direct conflict with enunciated
indecent and harmful programming standards and
the government's strong interest in protecting chil-
dren. Channeling graphic aborted fetuses to times of
the day when the risk of young viewers would be
minimal would not constrain the no-censorship pro-
visions of section 315. The candidates who are em-
ploying these images are doing so because they ad-
mittedly intend to shock the viewers. As in Pacifica
where George Carlin's monologue was sanctioned as
154 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
"verbal shock treatment" by the Supreme Court, so
too must "visual shock treatment" be sanctioned.
Applying the nuisance rationale of Pacifica, pro-
gramming which is not acceptable to community
standards must be channeled to protect child viewers.
Channeling only those images to later broadcast
times does not limit the candidate from discussing
and promoting her political ideology in a manner
which does not harm young viewers. As the Supreme
Court made clear in Pacifica, channeling of pro-
gramming which falls within 18 U.S.C. § 1464 is
not a form of censorship."' The content of the pro-
gramming remains unchanged, only the time of day
when it may be broadcast is restricted.
The irony that the FCC will afford political can-
didates a higher level of protection than our nation's
children is two-fold. First, it is irresponsible for the
FCC, with its acute hearing, to place itself in loco
parentis when issuing fines for the indecent language
broadcast over the radio, while turning a blind eye to
the use of graphic aborted fetuses. Second, it is illogi-
cal that the FCC will not regulate the potentially
harmful content of political broadcasting for the pro-
tection of those who, no matter whether positively or
negatively impacted by these images, cannot vote.
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